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Recent literature has emphasized the importance of transport costs and
infrastructure in explaining trade, access to markets, and increases in per capita
income. For most Latin American countries, transport costs are a greater barrier to
U.S. markets than import tariffs. We investigate the determinants of shipping
costs to the U.S. with a large database of more than 300,000 observations per year
on shipments of products at the six-digit HS level from different ports around the
world. Distance and containerization matter. In addition, we find that efficiency of
ports is an important determinant of shipping costs. Improving port efficiency
from the 25th to the 75th percentile reduces shipping costs by 12 percent. (Bad
ports are equivalent to being 60 percent farther away from markets for the average
country.) Inefficient ports also increase handling costs, which are one of the
components of shipping costs. We try to explain variations in port efficiency and
find that they are linked to excessive regulation, the prevalence of organized
crime, and the general condition of the country’s infrastructure. Finally, we
present a number of success stories in Latin America to show that private
involvement in port management leads to efficiency and lower costs whenever it
is accompanied by labor reform, and when monopoly power is reduced through
either regulation or competition.
JEL number: [F1, L41, L92]
Keywords: maritime transport costs, port efficiency
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1. Introduction
Since the beginning of modern economics the literature concerning the determination of living
standards has been interested in trade.
1 Despite some lingering controversy, empirical studies
show a positive relationship between trade and growth. Frankel and Romer (1999) claim that
“…trade has a quantitatively large, significant, and robust positive effect on income.”
2
The lack of initial consensus among researchers on the relationship between trade and
growth has been mirrored by differences in the actual trade strategies of developing countries.
During the 1960s and into the 1970s, many countries adopted import substitution policies to
protect their infant industries, though a few economies in East Asia took a different approach. By
the 1990s many developing countries, including most of the large ones, had shifted to an
outward-oriented strategy and had seen accelerations in their growth rates.
3
These recent liberalizations have reduced tariff and, in some cases, non-tariff barriers too.
For instance, Asia reduced its average tariff rate from 30 percent at the beginning of the 1980s to
14 percent by the end of the 1990s, and Latin America reduced its average tariff rate from 31
percent to 11 percent.
4 These reductions in artificial trade barriers have implied that the relative
importance of transport costs as a determinant of trade has increased.
5 As shown in Figure 1, in
1997 total import freight costs represented 5.25 percent of world imports. This percentage, which
may seem low, is mainly driven by developed countries, which represent more than 70 percent of
world imports and whose proximity to each other is reflected in a relatively low freight cost (4.2
percent). When these costs are disaggregated by region, they turn out to be substantially higher.
Although Latin America appears to have low freight costs relative to the other developing
regions (7 percent compared to 8 percent for Asia and 11.5 percent for Africa), the Latin
American figure is weighted by Mexico’s proximity to its main trading partner, the United
                                                
1 In his discussion of specialization and the extent of the market in The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith stresses the
relationship between wealth and trade between nations.
2 Similarly, Ades and Glaeser (1999) find that openness accelerates growth of backward economies. For a skeptical
view of the cross-national evidence, see Rodríguez and Rodrik (1999).
3  See Dollar and Kraay (2001).
4 Central America and the Caribbean reduced its average tariff rate from 21 percent to 9 percent between these
periods, and African countries from 30 percent to 20 percent. These average tariff rates correspond to simple
averages across countries of their unweighted tariff. If we consider weighted tariffs, the resulting average tariff rates
by the end of the 1990s should be smaller (Source: World Bank
http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/TR_Data.html).
5 See Amjadi and Yeats (1995) and Radelet and Sachs (1998).6
States, and consequently low freight costs. When Mexico is excluded, Latin American average
freight costs rise to 8.3 percent, more similar to the rest of the developing countries.
As liberalization continues to reduce artificial barriers, the effective rate of protection
provided by transport costs is now in many cases higher than the one provided by tariffs.  Figure
2 presents a comparison of average tariffs and a measure of transport costs for various countries
around the world, and Figure 3 presents an alternative comparison of transport costs to the US
and average tariffs faced in the US market by a group of Latin American countries. From Figure
3, it is striking to realize that for some countries, such as Chile and Ecuador, transport costs
exceed by more than twenty times the average tariffs they face in the US market. Consequently,
any additional effort to integrate a country into the trading system should consider and analyze
the effect of transport costs and their determinants.
As a result, some immediate questions arise. How much do these transport costs affect
trade and growth? How much of these costs can be affected by government policies? The broad
literature that applies the gravity approach to the study of international bilateral trade shows that
geographical distance, which is used as proxy for transport costs, is negatively related to trade.
6
In a recent paper, Limao and Venables (2000, henceforth LV) show that raising transport costs
by 10 percent reduces trade volumes by more than 20 percent. They also show that poor
infrastructure accounts for more than 40 percent of predicted transport costs. In a different
analysis, Radelet and Sachs (1998) show that shipping costs reduce the rate of growth of both
manufactured exports and GDP per capita. These authors claim that “… doubling the shipping
cost (e.g., from an 8 percent to a 16 percent CIF band) is associated with slower annual growth
of slightly more than half of one percentage point.”
In spite of the relevance of transport costs for trade and growth, there are not many other
studies on transport costs. Moreover, these few studies rely on macro level data, which is
certainly useful but misses the advantages that microdata can provide. An exception is a recent
study by Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2000, henceforth FMN), which analyzes the determinants of
maritime transport costs in 1998, focusing on the effect of non-competitive public and private
policies. They find the latter have a significant effect on transport costs. But, what about other
factors influencing transport costs, such as port efficiency? There is widespread consensus on the
crucial importance of port activities for transport services. However, there are no measures of the
                                                
6 An example of this literature is Bergstrand (1985).7
importance of port-level inefficiencies for transport costs. This is one of the objectives of this
study. We analyze the effect of port efficiency on transport costs (in addition to other standard
variables), and then we explore the factors that lie behind port efficiency.
Our analysis departs from FMN (2000) by incorporating port efficiency variables and by
redefining some variables. In addition, we address the problems of endogeneity and omitted
variable bias that their estimations present, and we also extend backward the period of analysis to
1995. We find that a 100 percent increase in distance raises maritime transport costs by around
20 percent, a result that is quite consistent with the existing literature. With respect to port
efficiency, we find that improving port efficiency from the 25
th to 75
th percentiles reduces
shipping costs by more than 12 percent. This result is robust to different definitions of port
efficiency as well as to different years.
In turn, when looking at the determinants of port efficiency, we find that the level of
infrastructure and organized crime exert a significant positive and negative influence
respectively. In addition, policy variables reflecting regulations at seaports affect port efficiency
in a non-linear way. This result suggests that having some level of regulation increases port
efficiency, but an excess of regulation could start to reverse these gains.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a description of
factors that may be behind transport costs. Section 3 describes the econometric model used to
quantify the relative importance of factors affecting transport costs. It also contains a description
of the data used, as well as the results of our analyses. In Section 4, we analyze the importance of
infrastructure, regulation and organized crime in explaining port efficiency. Section 5 presents
several success stories in Latin American port management. Section 6 concludes.
2.  What Factors Explain Maritime Transport Costs?
As discussed above, transport costs may be an important barrier to trade and could have an
important effect on income. But why do some countries have higher transport costs than others?
What are the main determinants of these transport costs? Can government policies affect these
costs? Following some previous studies,
7 this section addresses these questions, based on a
qualitative and quantitative description of transport cost determinants. Given its relative
                                                
7 This section follows McConville (1999), Furchsluger (2000a and 2000b), Limao and Venables (2000), and Fink,
Mattoo and Neagu (2000).8
importance (and also the availability of data), the main focus of this paper is on international
maritime transport cost.
The nature of services provided by shipping companies forces them to be transnational
companies serving more than one country. In general, these companies have access to
international capital markets and they are able to hire workers from all over the world,
8 although
sometimes under certain restrictions. In any case, we should not expect differences in capital or
labor costs to be the main factors in explaining differences in transport costs across countries.
There are many other important specific factors affecting transport costs across countries, which
we present next.
The obvious and most studied determinant of transport cost is geography, particularly
distance.
9 The greater the distance between two markets, the higher the expected transport cost
for their trade. Using shipping company quotes for the cost of transporting a standard container
from Baltimore (USA) to selected worldwide destinations, LV (2000) find that an extra 1,000 km
raises transport costs by $380 (or 8 percent for a median shipment). Moreover, breaking the
journey into an overland and a sea component, an extra 1,000 km by sea raises costs by only
$190 while the same distance by land raises costs by $1,380—4 and 30 percent of a median
shipment, respectively. In addition, if a country is landlocked, transport costs rise by $2,170,
almost a 50 percent increase in the average cost.
10 In other words, being landlocked is equivalent
to being located 10,000 km farther away from markets.
Trade composition additionally helps to explain transport costs differences across
countries. First of all, due to the insurance component of transport costs, products with higher
unit value have higher charges per unit of weight. On average, insurance fees are around 2
percent of the traded value and represent around 15 percent of total maritime charges. Therefore,
high value-added exporting countries should have higher charges per unit weight due to this
                                                
8 Shipping companies prefer to sail their ships under open-registry flags. This explains why Panama, Liberia, Cyprus
and Bahamas account for more than 40 percent of world fleets as measured in dead weight tons, or dwt (UNCTAD,
1999).
9 It has long been recognized that bilateral trade patterns are well described empirically by the so-called gravity
equation, which relates bilateral trade positively to both countries’ GDP and negatively to the distance (which is
used as proxy for transport cost) between them. See Bergstrand (1985).
10 This result controls for the extra overland distance that must be traversed by landlocked countries in order to reach
the sea.9
insurance component. On the other hand, some products require special transport features and
therefore have different freight rates.
11
Directional imbalance in trade between countries implies that many carriers are forced to
haul empty containers on their return trips. As a result, either imports or exports become more
expensive. Furchsluger (2000a) shows that this phenomenon is observed in the bilateral trade
between the US and the Caribbean. In 1998, for instance, 72 percent of containers sent from the
Caribbean to the US were empty. This excess of supply in the northbound route implied that a
US exporter paid 83 percent more than a US importer for the same type of merchandise between
Miami and Port of Spain (Trinidad and Tobago).
12 Similar phenomena occur in the Asian-US and
the Asian-European trade routes, where excess of supply means that Asian exporters end up
paying more than 50 percent in extra transport costs compared to suppliers in the US and
Europe.
13
Maritime transport is a classic example of example of an industry that faces increasing
return to scale. Alfred Marshall put it clearly long ago: “… a ship’s carrying power varies as the
cube of her dimensions, while the resistance offered by the water increases only a little faster
than the square of her dimensions.”
14 Besides increasing returns at the vessel level, there are
economies of scale at the seaport level. For instance, at the port of Buenos Aires (Argentina) the
cost of using the access channel is $70 per container for a 200 TEU
15 vessel but only $14 per
container for a 1,000 TEU vessel.
16 In general, even though most of these economies of scale are
at the vessel level, in practice they are related to the total volume of trade between two regions.
Maritime routes with low trade volumes are covered by small vessels and vice versa.
17
In addition, the development of containerized transport has been an important
technological change in the transport sector during the last decades. Containers have allowed
                                                
11 Louisiana State University-National Ports and Waterways Institute (1998) shows that the average freight rates
between Central America and Miami for cooled load merchandise is about twice the transport cost for textiles.
12 The actual freight rates for a 20-feet dry container between Miami and Port of Spain were $1,400 and $750 for the
southbound and northbound route, respectively.
13 Ships going from Asia to the US utilize more than 75 percent of their capacity, while when going back to Asia the
utilization does not even attain a 50 percent rate. The rates from Asia to the US and in the opposite direction are
$1,561/TEU (twenty-feet equivalent unit) and $999/TEU respectively. The capacity utilization of ships from Asia to
Europe is 75% and 58% in the opposite direction, while the rates charged by shipping companies are $1,353/TEU
and $873/TEU respectively.
14 Quoted by McConville (1999). Additional economies of scale come from both material to build the vessel and
labor to operate it (especially that of navigation).
15 TEU is a standard container measure and it refers to Twenty Feet Equivalent Unit.
16 See Fuchsluger (2000b).10
large cost reductions in cargo handling, increasing cargo transshipment and therefore national
and international cabotage.
18 In turn, this increase in cabotage has induced the creation of hub
ports that allow countries or regions to take advantage of increasing return to scale.
19
Commercial routes more liable to competition and less subject to monopoly power will
tend to have lower markups. Monopoly powers can be sustained either by government restrictive
trade policies or by private anti-competitive practices (cartels). The former includes a variety of
cargo reservation schemes, such as the UN Liner Code.
20 Private anti-competitive practices
include, among others, the practice of fixing rates of maritime conferences.
21 Some authors have
claimed that maritime conferences have lost power in recent years,
22 which has forced shipping
companies to merge as a way to maintain their monopoly power.
23
Similar restrictions and anti-competitive practices can induce inefficiencies and/or
monopoly power in ports. For example, in many countries workers are required to have special
license to be able to provide stevedoring services, and in general these restrictions imply high
fees and low productivity.
24
Finally, the quality of onshore infrastructure is an important determinant of transport
costs. LV (2000) find that it accounts for 40 percent of predicted transport costs for coastal
countries, and up to 60 percent for landlocked ones.
25 If a country with a relatively poor
infrastructure, say at the 75
th percentile in an international ranking, is able to upgrade to the 25
th
percentile, it will be able to reduce transport costs by between 30 and 50 percent.
26
                                                                                                                                                            
17 See PIERS, On Board Review, Spring 1997.
18  Cabotage refers to transshipment of the merchandise before it arrives to its final destination.
19 See Hoffman (2000).
20 This agreement stipulates that conference trade between two economies can allocate cargo according to the
40:40:20 principle. Forty per cent of tonnage is reserved for the national flag lines of each exporting and importing
economy and the remaining 20 per cent is to be allocated to liner ships from a third economy.
21 Maritime conferences enjoy an exemption from competition rules in major trading countries, like the US and the
European Union.
22 In the last years there have been some reforms in the regulation affecting international shipping. For instance, the
United States’ Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 eroded the power of conferences, creating greater scope for
price competition.
23 See Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2000) and Hoffman (2000).
24 In 1981 the supply of seaport service were de-regulated in Chile, and the change in legislation induced a
significant fall in seaport cost. See Trujillo and Nombela (1999) and Cámara Chilena Maritima (1999) for a
discussion of this case.
25 Their infrastructure index is measured as a simple weighted average of kilometers of road, paved road, rail and
telephone main line (per square Km of country area and population, respectively).  In their regression, the authors
use this index to the power of -0.3.
26 LV (2000) use two alternative measures of transport costs: CIF/FOB ratios reported for bilateral trade between
countries by the IMF and quotes from a shipping company. According to them, an improvement in own11
3.  Maritime Transport Costs Estimation
Focusing on the factors affecting transport costs already described, this section attempts to
quantify the importance of most
27 of them on maritime transport charges paid by U.S. imports
carried by liner companies
28 from countries all over the world. This analysis closely follows
FMN (2000). However, we add additional variables—notably a measure of port efficiency—to
the analysis, we redefine some of the other relevant variables (including the dependent variable),
and we also extend backward the period of analysis to 1995. In addition, we address the
problems of endogeneity and omitted variable bias we believe their estimations present, which
we explain in the rest of this section.
The Model
To estimate the importance of each factor in maritime transport costs we use a standard reduced
form approach. Maritime charges are assumed to be equal to the marginal cost multiplied by
shipping companies’ markup. Expressed in logarithm, we have:
pijk = mc(i,j,k) + µ (I, J, k) [1]
Where:
pijk: charges per unit of weight, in logarithm, for the product k transported between locations i
and j.
i: corresponds to foreign port, located in country I
j: corresponds to US port, located in district J
k: product, aggregated at the 6 digit of the Harmonized System (HS) Classification
mc: marginal cost, in logarithm.
µ : markup, in logarithm.
                                                                                                                                                            
infrastructure from the 75
th to the 25
th percentiles reduces transport costs by 30 percent based on shipping data (from
$6,604 to $4,638) and by more than 50% based on the CIF/FOB ratio (from 1.40 to 1.11). In addition, an
improvement in own and transit countries’ infrastructures from the 75
th to the 25
th percentiles reduces by more than
half the disadvantage associated with being landlocked.
27 We do not analyze the impact of trade imbalance in transport charges because of data unavailability.
28 For most countries, US imports account for a significant share of their exports. For instance, US imports
accounted for 56 percent of Latin American exports in 1999, and they accounted for 31 percent of Japan’s exports in
2001.12
As expressed in equation [1], both the marginal cost and the markup should be a function
of factors depending on the port or country of origin (i,I), the port or district of destiny in the US
(j,J) and the type of product (k). In particular, we assume that the marginal cost has the following
form:
mcijk = α J + λ k + ψ  wvijk + γ  Tijk + ∂  diJ + η  qIJ + ω  PEI [2]
Where:
α J: dummy variable referring to US district J.
λ k: dummy variable referring to product k.
wvijk: value per weight for product k, transported from foreign port i to US port j, in logarithm.
We also refer to this variable as the weight value.
Tijk: fraction of k goods shipped (from i to j) in containers.
diJ: distance between foreign port i and US custom district J, in logarithm.
qIJ: volume of imports carried by liner companies between country I and US coasts, in logarithm.
PEI: ports’ efficiency of foreign country I.
The first term (α J) in equation [2] takes into account potential differences in port
efficiencies across US customs districts. The second term (λ k) accounts for different marginal
costs across products. The third term—weight value(wvijk)—is used as a proxy for the insurance
component of the maritime transport cost (pijk). The fourth term (Tijk) represents a technological
effect, and it captures reductions in costs induced by the utilization of containers. The fifth term
(diJ) refers to the maritime distance between trade partners. The next variable (qIJ) accounts for
potential economies of scale, and the last term (PEI) accounts for port efficiency in the foreign
country. Thus, we expect a positive sign for ψ  and ∂ , and a negative sign for γ , η , and ω .
  At this stage, we highlight three differences with respect to FMN (2000). The first two
refer to the construction of the dependent variable and the variable measuring economies of
scale. For the first, we use charges per weight (instead of charges per unit, as they do), because—
despite the level of disaggregation of the data—there are still important differences inside
product categories. This heterogeneity inside product categories is better captured when using
our definition. With respect to the economy of scale variable, we define it as the volume of13
imports departing from a particular foreign country and arriving to a particular coast in the US.
29
A third and more important difference lies in the inclusion of the weight-to-value variable. As
already stated, this variable accounts for the effect of the insurance component on the transport
cost and, as we show next, it turns out to be highly significant. FMN (2000) do not include a
variable of this type, probably because of the inclusion of dummies per product. However,
because of the insufficient level of disaggregation of the data, product dummies are not enough
and the exclusion of this variable can cause important omitted variable bias.
30
Finally, and here we follow more closely FMN (2000) formulation, we assume that
shipping companies’ markups have the following form:







PA: existence of price-fixing agreements between country I and US district J.
AIJ
CA: existence of cooperative working agreement between country I and US district J.
The first term (ρ k) in the above equation reflects a product-specific effect that captures
differences in transport demand elasticity across goods (this is a derived demand from the final
demand of good k in the US). The last two terms account for potential collusive agreements
between shipping companies covering a same route. Two types of agreements are distinguished:
price-fixing agreements (which include most maritime conferences), and cooperative working
agreements that do not have binding rate setting authority. Substituting the second and third
equations into the first, we obtain the econometric model to be estimated:




CA + ε ijk       [4]
Where:
β k ≡  λ  k +ρ  k
ε ijk: error term.
                                                
29 FMN (2000) define this variable as the total value of imports departing from a particular foreign port and arriving
at a particular US district.
30 We replicated FMN (2000) estimations with and without the unit value variable (which is the relevant variable to
add in their specification, given their construction of the dependent variable). The variable turned out to be highly
significant (even after using product dummies), but their results for the rest of the variables changed dramatically.14
Data
31 and Results
Data on maritime transport costs, value and volume of imports, and shipping characteristics, such
as the percentage of goods transported through containers, come from the U.S. Import
Waterborne Databank (U.S. Department of Transportation). Our dependent variable, transport
costs, is constructed using imports charges, defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as: “...the
aggregate cost of all freight, insurance, and other charges (excluding U.S. import duties) incurred
in bringing the merchandise from alongside the carrier at the port of exportation—in the country
of exportation—and placing it alongside the carrier at the first port of entry in the United States.”
The U.S. Import Waterborne Databank covers the period 1995-1999. Even though this
database includes all U.S. imports carried by sea, classified by type of vessel service (liner,
tanker and tramp), we focus only on liner services to be able to estimate the effect of conferences
and agreements in maritime charges.
32  Liner imports account for around 50 percent of total US
imports and 65 percent of US maritime imports.
33 Given that our objective is to focus only on
maritime transport costs, we also drop all the observations for which the origin of the import is
different from the port of shipment.
34
The distance variable and the data on maritime conferences and working agreement
between liners were kindly provided by FMN (2000). The first correspond to the distance
between foreign ports and US custom districts; it is expressed in nautical miles, and comes in
turn from a private service. The data on carrier agreements, used by FMN to construct their
indices, comes from the Federal Maritime Commission; it covers 59 countries and is available
only for 1998. Therefore, when estimating for the other years (1995-97, 1999), we have no
choice but to use the same 1998 values for all them.
Unfortunately, there is not much comparable information about port efficiency, at the
individual port level, to be used in a cross-country analysis.
35 We therefore use an aggregated
per-country measure of port efficiency, consisting of a one-to-seven index (with 7 being the best
                                                
31 Appendix A gives a complete description of the data used.
32 This also allow us to compare our results with FMN (2000) ones. Liner services are scheduled carriers that
advertise in publications advance of sailing. They generally have a fixed itinerary and tend to carry mixed types of
containerized, non-bulk cargo. Tramp and tanker services, in turn, are (dry, liquid) bulk carriers and have no regular
scheduled itineraries, but travel depending on momentary demand.
33 The remaining US imports by sea are carried by tramp services.
34 That is, in-transit merchandise is not included.15
score) from the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). This annual data is available for the
period 1995-1999.
36 As an alternative measure, we also use GDP per capita as a proxy for port
efficiency. Countries’ GDP per capita are correlated with their level of infrastructure. For our
particular problem, explaining the cost of shipping the same product from different ports in the
world to the U.S., it is hard to see why the per capita GDP of the sending country would matter
except to the extent that it is proxying for the quality of infrastructure. As noted, we will use both
this indirect measure and a direct measure of port efficiency in different specifications.
In addition to the per capita GDP, we construct a second measure of infrastructure—this
time an index à la LV (2000)—based on information at country level on paved road, paved
airports, railways and telephone lines.
37 We incorporate this variable based on the assumption
that the infrastructure level in a country is likely highly correlated with the infrastructure level at
their ports, and also because it allows us to compare our results with LV (2000). We should note
that, despite having a somewhat similar infrastructure index, our formulation differs from that of
LV (2000) in many respects. First, one of their measures of transport costs is the CIF/FOB (cost
insurance freight/free on board) ratio, which has the disadvantage of being an aggregate measure
for all products, while we use transport cost information at product level. Also, this measure is
well known for having measurement deficiencies (although LV try to control for that). LV’s
second measure of transport costs, shipping rates (for a homogeneous product) from Baltimore to
a group of different countries, tries to address these problems. However, as the authors point out,
the shipping rates from Baltimore are not necessarily representative, not even for other US ports.
Our database, on the other hand, has information from many ports around the world to different
ports in the US.
38 An advantage of their second measure, however, is that it allows them to
construct an estimate of inland transport cost, which is not our purpose in this paper.
Table 1 reports our estimations for equation [4]. We start by presenting the results only
for 1998 because the variables on maritime conferences and working agreement between liners
                                                                                                                                                            
35 The World Bank is launching a program (Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade) to focus
on significant improvements in the invisible infrastructure of transport and trade in different member countries.
However, the project is in its first stage and does not yet cover all the countries in our sample.
36 The report, in turn, is based on micro-data from annual surveys at firm level, made to a representative group of
enterprises in every country. The particular question for port efficiency is: “Port facilities and inland waterways are
extensive and efficient (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).” The number of countries covered has been
growing over time (from 44 in the 1996 report to 56 in the 2000 report).
37 See Appendix A for a description of its construction.
38 In addition, we believe their second sample is biased in favor of African countries. The bad infrastructure and port
quality of African countries may be biasing upward the coefficient estimates they obtain.16
refer to this particular year. The first three columns show the coefficients using OLS, while the
rest of the estimations use an Instrumental Variable (IV) technique.
39 Columns (1) and (4) report
the results using GDP per capita as a proxy for port efficiency, columns (2) and (5) use the
variable port efficiency from the GCR, and columns (3) and (6) use the index of infrastructure
we constructed. As can be seen, in both types of estimations most of the variables are highly
significant and with the expected sign.
Distance has a significant (at 1 percent) positive effect on transport costs. A doubling in
distance, for instance, generates a roughly 20 percent increase in transport costs. This distance
elasticity close to 0.2 is consistent with the existent literature on transport costs. The value per
weight variable is also positive and highly significant, with a t-statistic around 50. As already
stated, these regressions include dummy variables for products at the six-digit HS level. One
might think that unit values would be quite similar across countries at that level of
disaggregation, but this is not so.  Feenstra (1996) shows that there is a large variation in unit
values even at the 10-digit HS level. He cites the examples of men’s cotton shirts, which the U.S.
imports from fully half of its 162 trading partners. The unit values range from $56 (Japan) to $1
(Senegal). These differences in unit values lead to large differences in insurance costs per
kilogram, even for “homogeneous” products. So, it is not surprising that we find that the more
expensive the product, per unit of weight, the higher the insurance and hence the overall
transport cost.
40
With respect to the two variables referring to agreements between liner companies, only
the first of them (price fixing binding agreements) turns out to be positive, as expected, but only
significant (at 10 percent) in two specifications.
41 This result seems to suggest that maritime
conferences have been exerting some mild monopoly power, adding an estimated 6 percent to
                                                
39 In all the estimations (OLS, IV), we allow the observations to be independent across exporting countries, but not
necessarily independent within countries. At the same time, the standard errors presented in the table correspond to
the consistent Huber/White ones.
40 In addition, there is the possibility that the unit weight variable could be capturing some measurement errors. The
argument is as follows. One should expect that the variables charges and (total) import value were very carefully
measured, because the US custom constructs the dutiable value of imports by excluding the former to the latter (and
it should have a special interest in calculating it correctly). However, this could not be case for the measurement of
weight. If so, measurement errors in the weight variable would induce a positive correlation between charges per
weight (our dependent variable) and value per weight.
41 FMN (2000) find the price-fixing agreement dummy variable to be significant and much larger in magnitude:
between 0.4 and 0.51; that is, the maritime agreements add at least 40 percent to transport costs. They also use
policy variables referring to cargo reservation policies (not significant), cargo handling services (significant in one17
transport costs in 1998, ceteris paribus. However, as we will see later, this estimated effect of
price-fixing agreements is not always significant for other years.
The next variable, the level of containerization, presents a significant negative effect on
transport costs. As explained before, this variable represents technological change at both vessels
and seaport level. The idea behind this result is that containerization reduces services cost, such
as cargo handling, and therefore total maritime charges.
The variable capturing economies of scale is the level of trade that goes through a
particular maritime route.
42 This variable, calculated in terms of volume, has a significant
negative coefficient (as expected).
43 However, the direct incorporation of this variable into the
estimations presents a problem of endogeneity. On one hand, one should expect the more the
trade the lower the transport costs. But, at the same time, lower transport costs induce more
trade. We address this problem in columns  (4) to (6).
Finally, the coefficient related to port efficiency is negative and significant (at 1% in all
cases): the greater the efficiency at port level, the lower the transport costs. This result is robust
to the three alternative measures of port efficiency (columns 1 to 3). In particular, the coefficient
for the measure from the Global Competitiveness Report (column 2), along with the distribution
of the port efficiency index among countries, indicates that an improvement in port efficiency
from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile reduces transport charges a little more than 12 percent.
44 In
terms of particular countries, if China, Indonesia and/or Mexico, for instance, improved their
port efficiency to levels observed in countries like France and/or Sweden, their reductions in
transport costs would be around 12 percent. Similar results are obtained for the other measures.
45
                                                                                                                                                            
estimation but with wrong sign, and not significant in another), and mandatory port services (significant, correct
sign).
42 Each couple foreign country and US coast is defined as a maritime route. We define three coasts in the US: East,
West and Gulf coast.
43 We must note that this variable differs from the one presented by Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2000) in two aspects.
First, they use the value of imports while we use the volume of imports (in tons). Second, the definitions of maritime
route through which economies of scale arise are different: they use the trade (in value) between foreign ports and
US districts (31), while we use the trade (in volume) between foreign countries and US coasts (3).
44 That is, when port efficiency is measured with the GCR index, an improvement in port efficiency from 25
th to 75
th
percentile (i.e., from a score of 3.4 to 5.6 respectively) generates a maritime transport costs decline of around 12
percent.
45 When proxying port efficiency with the per capita GDP, an increase from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile reduces
maritime transport charges in 14 percent. When using the infrastructure index, the reduction in transport costs is
around 8 percent. This last variable could be showing a smaller effect because in fact it is measuring the existence of
infrastructure, but not necessarily its quality, while the other measures should capture also quality.18
To solve the endogeneity problem mentioned above, we use countries’ GDP as an
instrument. We make the identifying assumption that if country size affects transport costs, it
does so through the volume of trade and economies of scale in shipping.  Columns (4) to (6) in
Table 1 present the results for the instrumental variable (IV) estimations. Most coefficients
remain stable, with the expected signs, and they continue to be significant. Using the
instrumental variables, the economy of scale variable remains negative and significant, but the
magnitude of the coefficient increases in absolute value when we use the GCR measure of port
efficiency (-0.04 v/s -0.02). Thus, we estimate that doubling the volume of trade between a
particular port and the U.S. reduces transport costs by 3-4 percent.  As we already mentioned, the
coefficients for the rest of the variables—in particular, for the three port efficiency measures, in
particular—are quite stable.
We performed similar estimations for the rest of the years for which we have data. For
brevity of space, Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients only for the IV regressions using the
GCR variable for port efficiency.
46
For each year, the coefficients on distance and weight-to-value are quite stable and
significant (at 1 percent).
47 Prior to 1999, the first year after the US eroded the power of
Conferences, the price-fixing rate agreement has the expected sign but it is only significant (at 10
percent) in 1997. In 1999, the coefficient turns negative, a result that may be related to a war in
prices between shipping companies that were previously members of conferences.  Cooperative
agreement is significant only in 1995, but with the wrong sign. In addition, when we use the
infrastructure index that we created (not shown here) none of these policy variables is
significant. From these results it is difficult to conclude whether conferences have been exerting
monopoly power.
From Table 2 we can see that the coefficient on containerization is significant only in
1998.
48 In the case of Total Liner Volumes, the coefficient is in general significant and quite
stable over time. Finally, the estimated coefficient for port efficiency is stable and significant
from both an economic and statistical point of view. When we used the infrastructure index from
                                                
46 We use the port efficiency index from the 1999 GCR for all years, in order to avoid a drastic decrease in the
number of countries covered by the report.
47 The exception is the coefficient for distance in 1999, which increases to 0.25. One reason why distance may be
having a bigger effect this year could be the increase in oil prices (from an average of $13/barrel in 1998 to
$18/barrel in 1999).
48 The low variance on the containerization levels in liner transport services may be explaining this non-significance.19
the GCR (not shown here) we obtain similar results in terms of stability and significance. These
results allow us to conclude that port efficiency is an important determinant of maritime transport
costs. For example, if countries like Ecuador, India or Brazil improved their port efficiency from
their current level to the 75
th percentile, that is, to a level attained by France or Sweden, they
would reduce their maritime transport costs by more than 15 percent each.
A final caveat about these results. Our model assumes that, if inefficiency in a port raises
shipping costs by 10 percent for a shipment of shirts, it will increase the shipping costs for a
shipment of cars by the same 10 percent. Suppose, instead, that the “tax equivalent” of port
inefficiency varies by product. Then, products for which the tax is excessively high will not be
exported and we will not observe them in the data. In other words, we have estimated the effect
of port inefficiency for products that are actually shipped.  The effect may be higher for some
products, which are then not exported. In this sense our estimate of the cost of port inefficiency
may be conservative.
4.  Determinants of Port Efficiency
The previous subsection stresses the importance of port efficiency on maritime transport cost, but
what are the factors behind port efficiency? The activities required at port level are sometimes
crucial for international trade transactions. These include not only activities that depend on port
infrastructure, such as pilotage, towing and tug assistance, or cargo handling (among others), but
also activities related to customs requirements. It is often claimed that “...the (in)efficiency, even
timing, of many of port operations is strongly influenced (if not dictated) by customs.”
49,50
Some legal restrictions can negatively affect port performance. For example, in many
countries workers are required to have special license to be able to provide stevedoring services,
artificially increasing seaport costs. Other deficiencies, associated with port management itself,
are also harmful to country competitiveness. For instance, some ports still receive cargo without
specifying the presentation of a Standard Shipping Note, which is inconceivable in modern port
practice. In many ports, it is quite impossible to obtain a written and accurate account of the
main port procedures, and sometimes port regulations are not clear about the acceptance of
                                                
49 Thus, any unexpected delay at ports due to extra custom requirements or cargo inspections, for instance, may
increase considerably the associated port costs (due to moving containers and storage of frozen products, for
example) and hence reduce exporters competitiveness.
50 See Raven (2001) for a description of relevant issues concerning trade and transport facilitation.20
responsibilities (for cargo in shed or on the quay, for instance). All of this generates
unreasonably long delays, increases the risks of damage and pilferage of the products (in turn
raising the insurance premiums), and as a consequence considerably increases costs associated
with port activities.
Port efficiency varies widely from country to country and, especially, from region to
region. It is well know that some Asian countries (Singapore, Hong Kong) have the most
efficient ports in the world, while some of the most inefficient are located in Africa (Ethiopia,
Nigeria, Malawi) or South America (Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador). Table 3 presents some
estimates of port efficiency per geographic region.
51
The first column is a subjective index based on surveys reported by the World Economic
Forum’s 1999 Global Competitiveness Report. North America and Europe have the best
rankings, followed by the Middle East, and East Asia and the Pacific. Latin America and South
Asia, in turn, are the regions perceived as having the least efficient ports. The second column
indicates the time, in median days, to clear customs (taken from business surveys performed by
the Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank
52). The most striking results are those
for Africa, Southeast Africa and West Africa, for which the median number of days to clear
customs is 12. Among East and South African countries, Ethiopia (30 days), Kenya, Tanzania
and Uganda (14 days each) are the countries with the longest delays in clearing customs; while
Cameroon (20 days), Nigeria (18 days) and Malawi (17 days) are the West African countries
with the biggest delays.
53 The second region presenting big problems at custom levels is Latin
America, with a median delay in clearing customs of 7 days. In this group, Ecuador (15 days)
and Venezuela (11 days) appear as the worst performers.
Finally, the third column of Table 3 presents some estimates of the costs of handling
containers inside the ports (in US$/TEU). This variable was constructed based on information
provided by the Transport Division of the World Bank and information from additional papers.
54
                                                
51 We must note that these efficiency variables, per region, are not directly comparable to each other, because the
availability of countries is not the same for each of the variables. Thus, we should think of these as complementary
rather than substitute measures.
52 The specific question is: “If you import, how long does it typically take from the time your goods arrive at their
port of entry until the time you can claim them from customs?”
53 The African countries’ results from this survey are totally consistent with the results presented by the African
Competitiveness Report 2000/2001 (World Economic Forum), which performed the same custom clearance question
(though the average time presented by the latter are slightly higher).
54 Cámara Maritima y Portuaria de Chile (1999) and Louisiana State University National Ports and Waterways
Institute (1998).21
Despite the fact that the sample of countries for this variable is much more restricted than for the
previous ones, the estimates are quite consistent with the previous variables. While the efficient
ports in East Asia present lower charges, Latin American ports have the most expensive handling
services. This relationship is even clearer when we take into account wage differentials across
countries. Table 4 presents the regression of handling costs, adjusted by wage or its proxy, on
port efficiency and an index of infrastructure (the same as used in Table 1). This index, at the
country level, is included under the assumption that infrastructure at the country level is highly
correlated with infrastructure at the port level. In Column (1) handling costs are adjusted by
manufacturing wages,
55 in Column (2) and (3) we adjust by per capita GDP (as proxy for wages),
and in Column (4) and (5) handling costs are adjusted by PPP GDP per capita.
  Port efficiency is an important determinant of handling cost. Countries with inefficient
seaports have higher handling costs. Also, countries with good infrastructure have lower seaport
costs. Figure 4 presents the relationship between handling costs and port efficiency, controlling
for PPP GDP per capita (as a proxy for wages) and infrastructure level (Column 4 specification
of Table 4). The clear negative relationship shows that countries where ports are considered the
most efficient (e.g., Singapore and Belgium, not shown in the figure) are at the same time the
ones whose ports charge the least for their services (in comparable units). In turn, some Latin
American countries (e.g., Brazil and Ecuador, not shown in the figure) are among the worst
ranked in term of their efficiency and also present the highest charges per services (after
controlling for the level of infrastructure).
56
Finally, we try to explain what factors underlie port efficiency. As we already mentioned
in the case of transport costs, it is reasonable to think that the determinants of port efficiency will
not only consist of infrastructure variables, but also of management and/or policy variables.
Therefore, besides a proxy for port infrastructure,
57 we include among the explanatory variables
two policy variables, one referring to Cargo Handling Restrictions and the other to Mandatory
Port Services. Both variables are zero-to-one indices from FMN (2000). The first captures
restrictions and special requirements imposed on foreign suppliers of cargo handling services,
                                                
55 Manufacturing wages are taken from UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database.
56 A similar result is obtained when manufacturing wages (from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database) are used,
instead of GDP per capita, to adjust handling costs. Appendix B presents the values used to construct these series.
57 We use the index of country infrastructure we constructed as proxy for port infrastructure.22
where foreign suppliers refer to local companies with foreign participation.
58 The second captures
the extent to which port services are mandatory for incoming ships.
59 Both indices represent
restrictions at port level that could limit competition, so we can expect a negative relationship
between them and port efficiency. However, due to some quality and security considerations, we
also have to consider that it may be beneficial to have a certain level of regulation at the seaports.
Thus, we also explore the possibilities of non-linearities of the effect of each of these indices on
port efficiency.
As mentioned above, we consider the overall level of infrastructure, which we assume to
be positively correlated with a country’s level of seaport infrastructure. We expect the better the
infrastructure the higher the probability of an efficient port; that is, a positive coefficient for this
variable. Finally, we also include a Crime Index, taken from the Global Competitiveness Report,
and consisting of a one-to seven index ranking how severe is organized crime in a particular
country (with 7 meaning “not a problem”). The idea behind the inclusion of this variable is that
organized crime constitutes a direct threat to port operations and merchandise in transit. With all
of this in mind, we present in Table 5 some estimations of the effects of these variables on port
efficiency, calculated for 1998.
As can be seen, the coefficient on infrastructure is always positive and significant. The
results for the policy variables are somehow mixed, but make some sense. Cargo handling
restrictions are not significant, no matter the specification. The crime variable also turns out to be
highly significant and with the expected positive sign (remember that the variable is defined as
crime “not being a problem”). In terms of this sample, an increase in organized crime from the
25
th to 75
th percentiles implies a reduction in port efficiency from 50
th to 25
th percentiles.  In
other words, if countries like Brazil, China or India (all with indices around the 75
th percentile)
reduced their organized crime to levels attained by countries like Australia, New Zealand or the
United Kingdom (all around the 25
th percentile), then they would be able to increase their port
efficiency index by roughly one point. This in turn would generate a reduction of maritime
transport costs of around 6 percent.
                                                
58 The index takes a value of 0 if no restriction exists, 0.25 for minor restrictions, 0.5 if a joint venture condition is
imposed, 0.75 if a very high national participation in the company is required, and 1 if foreign companies are simply
forbidden to provide cargo handling services.
59 This variable is constructed by adding 0.125 for each of the following services if they are mandatory: pilotage,
towing, tug assistance, navigation aids, berthing, waste disposal, anchorage and other mandatory services.23
Finally, the variable for mandatory port services, on the other hand, is significant both in
level and square level, presenting a positive and negative sign, respectively. This result suggests
that having some level of regulations increases port efficiency; however, an excess of regulation
can start to reverse these gains. In terms of the countries in our sample, this result suggests that
Argentina is taking advantage of a moderate level of regulation in its seaports, but instead Brazil
is reducing its seaport efficiency because of excess regulation. Using a non-parametric method
(adjusted spline), Figure 5 presents this non-linear relationship between regulation and port
efficiency.
The previous discussion of regulation introduces us to an important topic: ownership
structure. Many countries have allowed the private sector to be involved in common-using public
ports in the last decade. The main purposes of this new trend were to improve seaport efficiency
and/or to reduce the fiscal burden induced by port losses and public debt. The following section
describes the role played by recent reforms and the private sector in Latin American’s seaports
and their impact on efficiency.
5.  Towards a Latin American Model of Port Management?
60
Because the regulatory and institutional environment is so important for port efficiency, many
countries have welcomed the private sector in port management (see Box 1).  This has been a
global trend affecting both developed and developing economies.  In the latter, private
investment commitments in 112 projects amounted to more than $9 billion between 1990 and
1999.  In Latin America alone, the private sector has become involved in 64 projects worth $3.9
billion.  Although the main purpose of these initiatives has been to improve seaport efficiency,
privatization has also been motivated by the need to reduce the fiscal burden of port losses.  Even
though it is too soon to pass final judgment, the Latin American experience sees to show that
private involvement increases port efficiency when supported by labor reform, and when seaport
monopoly power is either adequately regulated or reduced by competition.
61
                                                
60 This section of the paper is based on Baird (1999), Cámara Marítima y Portuaria de Chile (1999), Estache and
Carbajo (1996), Foxley and Mardones (2000), Gaviria (1998), Hoffman (2000, 1999a), Nombela and Trujillo
(1999), and Viloria (2000)24
Private involvement in public seaports has been the result of new market conditions and
global trends in maritime transportation.  The new export-led growth paradigm adopted by many
countries has put pressure on port authorities to improve seaport efficiency, while
containerization and other technological changes in maritime transport have forced seaports to
modernize their installations and operational methods.  New investments and administrative and
labor reforms have been required for ports to successfully compete for cargo handling.  More
often than not, however, governments have been unable to financially commit to this challenge,
so private sector involvement has become critical.  Still, changes have been gradual and followed
different paths.  At the beginning of the 1980s some countries allowed private participation in
seaport services such as towing, pilotage and stevedoring.
62  Since 1981, private stevedore firms
have been allowed to perform all transfer services in Chilean state-owned ports, a system known
as the multi-operator model.  Meanwhile, Colombia allowed private operation of terminals and
berths alongside major port districts.
63  As a first step toward privatization in the United
Kingdom, the National Dock Labor scheme was abolished, liberalizing the labor market.  In
                                                                                                                                                            
61 Private involvement in managing and financing ports to date has been largely limited to captive facilities.  These
facilities, typically for bulk cargo, are often vertically integrated into production processes and not actively
promoted for use by third parties.
62 In the United Kingdom, Thatcherism went further and privatized the ports and the Port Authority.
63 These private berths would handle mainly liquid and solid bulk.
Box 1.  Organizational Models for Ports
Maritime transport literature characterizes ports according to the ownership of their
infrastructure and superstructure.  Accordingly, there are three types of ports:
service ports, tool ports and landlord ports.  Under the service port model—
commonly used for public ports in Latin America in the 1960s—the Port Authority
is in charge of infrastructure and superstructure, as well as overall operation of the
port.  The Port of Singapore is a publicly owned port of the service type, but there
can also be private service ports, such as that of Hong Kong.  The tool port can be
best described as one in which the Port Authority owns the infrastructure and the
superstructure, and its services are licensed to private firms.  Most public ports in
Latin America functioned under this scheme during the 1980s, and many Central
American countries continue to do so.  (Panama is an exception).  Finally, under the
landlord port system, the infrastructure belongs to and is managed by the Port
Authority, which grants concessions to private firms for port superstructure and to
provide all port services.  The concessionaire can undertake the investments
deemed necessary to best provide services.25
Asia, concessions for container operations in the port of Kelang (Malaysia) and the Manila
International Container Terminal were awarded in 1986 and 1988, respectively.  Most of the
initial experiences had a positive impact on port efficiency.
During the 1990s, private participation in public ports became more pronounced and led
the way to concession contracts that allowed private firms to operate ports and make investments
to improve the quality of services.  Pioneering this process in Latin America were Panama and
Colombia.  The former granted its first concession at Manzanillo International Terminal in 1993,
which started operations by 1995, and the latter offered its port concession in 1993.  Mexico was
also an early reformer.  The Ports Law enacted in 1994 allowed private firms to provide all port
services.  The major container terminals have since adopted the single-operator scheme.
Most public ports in Latin America are currently implementing the landlord port model.
Under this system, the infrastructure of the port belongs to the port authority and the
superstructure (including services such as pilotage and towage) is given in concession to a
private firm.  However, the reasons why countries have turned to this model have varied, as have
the ways in which they have carried out the process. Argentina and Brazil, with little
transcontinental commerce but with a large fiscal burden, were mainly driven by the fiscal
impact of concessions.  Colombia and Venezuela were mostly concerned with opening their
economies and improving port efficiency.
Regulation regimes also differed: countries with little intra or inter-port competition
implemented more restrictive regulations in order to curtail monopoly practices.  The ports of the
Andean Community, which are far away form each other and have poor road connections,
became more regulated.  On the other hand, given the proximity of MERCOSUR ports to one
another, there was less regulation in order to ensure competitive price levels.  A good example is
the competition for cargo between the ports of southern Brazil and those of Buenos Aires and
Montevideo.  Competition between them has been enhanced by improved highway infrastructure
that allows for more rapid connections with the interior of those countries.
Reforms have not reached all countries, however.  Central American ports such as those
in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua are still service ports where modernization
and labor reforms are yet to come.  In Costa Rica, ports have already licensed stevedoring
services, but investment and prices at the ports are still controlled by the government.  The
exception in the Central American region has been Panama.26
Initiatives by most countries of the region in the 1990s to reform the maritime sector have
led experts to define a new “Latin American model” encompassing the following features:
64
•   Public ports are part of the landlord type and mostly serve import cargo, while a high
percentage of bulk goes through privately owned and operated terminals.  For example,
in 1998, 86 percent of Chilean liquid bulk went through such ports.
•   Opportunities are available for private firms and foreign investors to establish new ports.
An example is the new private terminal in Zarate, Argentina.
•   Concessions have been granted for 12 to 30 years in order to promote private investment
in modernization of port infrastructure and superstructure.
Though not enough time has elapsed to pass final judgment on the reforms, several
results are clear.  In most cases, labor productivity has increased and handling cargo costs have
decreased.  Efforts have been made to promote competition between proximate ports, but land
transport infrastructure sill poses a serious obstacle to such competition.
National experiences have been diverse, and each one brings a lesson.  The Chilean case
shows that better management can significantly improve efficiency even without any additional
investment.  The Brazilian experience stresses the key role of labor reform.  Argentina shows
that competition is a good substitute for regulation, while Panama highlights the increasing
importance of cabotage in international trade.
Chile
Prior to 1981, the Empresa Portuaria de Chile (EMPORCHI) was in charge of 11 major public
ports and also had a monopoly on cargo handling.  The main aim of EMPORCHI was to improve
port efficiency and increase investment, especially in the ports of San Antonio and San Vicente,
which by the early 1970s were unable to receive wheat, corn, sugar and many other bulk
commodities.  As a monopolist, EMPORCHI created a system of cargo handling under which
two groups of workers coexisted: stevedores required to have a license to operate, and workers
hired directly by EMPORCHI to handle cargo from the ship to the port.  Because of high wages
for night work, ports did not operate at night, and EMPORCHI shifts did not match those of the
stevedores.  These conditions led to high costs and port inefficiency.
                                                
64 See Hoffman (2000, 1999a)27
In 1981, EMPORCHI’s monopoly was abolished and a multi-operator system was
introduced under which all cargo-handling services were licensed to private firms that could
meet quality and security requirements.  The personal licenses of stevedores were abolished,
eliminating their monopoly power.  Although the state compensated 2,700 workers with $50
million, this scheme proved to be very successful.
In 1979, experts advised the Chilean government to invest $200 million in seaports to
improve port services, an expenditure that was beyond the country’s fiscal capabilities at that
time.  However, cargo handling (including cabotage) of all public ports increased from 22
million tons in 1979 to 66 million in 1998 without any significant investment during this period
(see Figure 6). Port tariffs remained low and competitive, although Chile did not modernize its
ports, as did most Latin American countries during the 1990s.
In spite of this initial success, the division of cargo among several stevedore companies
limited incentives to invest in modern transfer equipment and did not permit an efficient use of
limited backup yard space.  This problem was exacerbated by the huge increase in trade during
the 1980s and 1990s.  The issue was finally addressed in 1997, when the Port Modernization
Law was enacted and 11 port authorities were created.  The law prohibited port authorities from
handling cargo or berthing.  Instead, they are required to lease the ports to private firms under a
single-operator scheme.  In addition, port authorities are encouraged to share revenues derived
from annual rent and operational revenues with the private firms.  The concessions are granted
for periods of 15 or 20 years, with the possibility of extension to a maximum of 30 years.  In
2000, four of the concessions, San Vicente, San Antonio, Valparaíso and Iquique, initiated
operations. The lease of these four ports in 1999 represented $300 million in income for the
government.  No lease was granted for the Port of Arica, in part because port authorities imposed
excessively high infrastructure requirements, which made the project unprofitable and would
likely have led to excessive investment.
The concession process prompted labor unrest at public ports.  As a result, the
government reached an agreement with workers to create a safety net that, if fully used, would
cost about $30 million.  One consequence of the plan was that 760 of 1,750 workers accepted
early retirement.
Three important lessons can be derived from the Chilean experience: (i) improvements in
efficiency may not require additional investments in infrastructure; (ii) even though a multi-28
operator system may be successful, it may not provide the right incentives for investment; and
(iii) concessions may provide an important service by preventing white elephant investments.
Brazil
In a country as diverse as Brazil, any generalization is bold.  Still, it seems safe to say that until
1993, when the Port Modernization Law was enacted, most Brazilian ports were highly
inefficient, excessively bureaucratic, and constantly under-funded.  The results were tariffs three
to six times higher than the international average, long waiting times for ships, and deficient
service provision.  The situation has since improved, but inefficiency is still rampant in some
ports.
The government decentralized the port system and started dismantling the public agency
Protobras in 1990.  Three years later, the Port Modernization Law allowed private participation
in cargo handling services and liberalized port tariffs in order to promote competition between
neighboring ports.  The original plan was to award concessions for 36 public ports, but the
process has lagged putting Brazil at a disadvantage with neighboring Argentina, where the
reform ahs been more aggressive. One reason is that reforms at Brazil’s ports have faced
constant resistance from labor unions.
65 The Port Modernization Law gave more flexibility to the
number of workers per “squadron,” but this has not been fully implemented in many ports.
Difficulties in reducing the number of employees have constrained the possibility of decreasing
port costs.  For example, in 1998, the average cost of handling a 10-foot container in Buenos
Aires was $180, while in Santos, Brazil, it was $350.  An important reason is that 50 workers are
required for handling the cargo of a ship at Santos, compared to only 14 in Buenos Aires.
However, in two Santos terminals currently operated by private firms, waiting time for
ships went from several days in 1997 to less than a day by 1999. Concessions of small ports such
as Itaji, Laguna, Cabedelo and Porto Velho were well advanced in 1999: 75 percent of all port
infrastructure had been leased to the private sector.  The operation of ports by private firms
reduced waiting time for ships and ports have become more competitive within the region.  The
tariff structure at Santos has been also modified, allowing a more market-oriented structure that
                                                
65 By 1998, the Brazilian Port Union had 66,000 affiliated workers, compared to 690 unionized port workers in
Argentina.29
has resulted in reduced tariffs for users of these port terminals.  Container handling charges were
$328 per TEU in 1998, down from $550 in 1996.
The main conclusion of the Brazilian experience is that labor reform in port activity is
essential to accomplish port concessions that increase productivity and reduce tariffs.
Argentina
As early as the 1970s, Argentina allowed the private sector to manage stevedoring at the public
port of Buenos Aires.  This early modernization effort never rendered satisfactory results in
terms of productivity because of the over-regulation and the overlapping supervisory functions of
state entities, strong labor unions that separated stevedoring and loading services, and a lack of
investment by the port authority.  In addition, other public ports were still operating under the
service model, functioning inefficiently and charging very high tariffs for cargo handling.
In 1990, the first steps were taken to deregulate and decentralize public ports in a more
comprehensive fashion.  Deregulation consisted of abolishing restrictive working practices at
ports and on vessels, and liberalizing rates for pilotage, towage and stevedoring.  In addition,
foreign ships were allowed to practice cabotage.  The government dismantled the Ports
Administration and transferred property of the major ports to the provinces, which were given
the responsibility of establishing their own port authorities in charge of maintaining the port
infrastructure and granting concessions to private firms.
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The Buenos Aires port was divided into the Dock Sud and Puerto Nuevo.  The central
government kept the latter and leased its six terminals to five different firms handling different
types of cargo.  In each terminal, a single stevedoring firm was allowed to operate under a single
operator scheme.  To date, the achievements of this port have been remarkable.  Cargo handling
increased 50 percent and labor productivity surged by 275 percent from 1990 to 1995.  This
progress has allowed Puerto Nuevo to compete with South America’s largest port, Santos in
Brazil.  As of 1997, Puerto Nuevo’s cargo handing had surpassed that of Santos (see Figure 7).
Currently, foreign firms can also participate in the construction of new private ports in
Argentina, as has been the case of a terminal in Zárate, which is being remodeled for container
handling.
                                                
66 Smaller ports—some of them long since out of service—were transferred to provinces, which were allowed to
operate or lease them to private firms or shut them down30
The Argentine case shows that even when some port services are supplied by the private
sector –as was the case before 1993- excessive regulation can constrain improvements in port
efficiency.  The country’s experience since then indicates that competition, whenever possible, is
preferable to regulation.
Panama
Panama was one of the first Latin American countries to privatize a public port.  The first
privatization took place in 1993, when a concession was granted to the Manzanillo International
Terminal (MIT).  The MIT started operation in 1995 and was so successful that it opened the
way for other port operating concessions.  The Colón Container Terminal (CCT) and the Port of
Cristóbal started operations in 1997, while the Port of Balboa did so in 2000.
This process also led to the dismantling of the National Port Authority and the
establishment of the Panama Maritime Authority (PMA) in 1998.  The PMA is the landlord
authority that awards port operating concessions to private firms and also regulates the maritime
industry.  The advantage of Panamanian ports such as MIT is their proximity to the Panama
Canal, making them ideal hubs.  MIT currently handle 70 percent of all containers that go
through Panama.  MIT’s throughput increased from 161,000 TEUs in 1995 to 878,000 TEUs in
19999, and most of the cargo is for trans-shipment.  In fact, 70 percent of all containers handled
in Panamanian ports are for trans-shipment.
The experience of Panama highlights the increasing importance of cabotage in
international trade.
6.  Conclusion
By the 1990s many countries had adopted a development strategy emphasizing integration with
the global economy and therefore had reduced their tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. This
reduction in artificial trade barriers has raised the importance of transport costs as a remaining
barrier to trade. Therefore, any strategy aimed at integrating a country into the trading system has
to take transport costs seriously.
Besides distance and other variables that no government can change, an important
determinant of maritime transport costs is seaport efficiency. An improvement in port efficiency31
from 25
th to 75
th percentiles reduces shipping costs by more than 12 percent, or the equivalent of
5,000 miles in distance. This result is robust to different definition of port efficiency as well as to
different years.  Inefficient ports also increase handling costs.
Seaport efficiency, though, is not just a matter of physical infrastructure. Organized crime
has an important negative effect on port services, increasing transport costs. In terms of our
sample, an increase in organized crime from the 25
th to 75
th percentiles implies a reduction in
port efficiency from 50
th to 25
th percentiles. In addition our results suggest that some level of
regulation increases port efficiency, but excessive regulation can be damaging. Moreover, a
number of success stories in Latin America show that private involvement in port management
leads to efficiency and lower costs whenever it is accompanied by labor reform, and when
monopoly power is reduced through either regulation or competition.32
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Appendix A. Data Description
Transport Costs Estimation (Tables 1 and 2)
Maritime Transport costs: calculated as import charges divided by weight. Source: Calculated
from data of the US Import Waterborne Databank (US Department of Transportation).
Distance: Correspond to the distance between the foreign port i and the US custom district J.
Data provided by Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2000).
Unit Weight: Value of total US imports divided by its total weight, and calculated per maritime
route (where we define routes as “from foreign ports to US custom districts”). Calculated from
data of the US Import Waterborne Databank (US Department of Transportation).
Price-Fixing agreement: Dummy variable signaling the presence of carrier agreements on
maritime routes: conferences and other price-fixing agreements. Source: Fink, Mattoo and Neagu
(2000).
Cooperative agreement: Dummy variable signaling the presence of carrier agreements on
maritime routes: cooperative working agreements that do not have a binding rate authority.
Source: Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2000).
Containerization: Percentage of cargo transported by containers. Source: US Import Waterborne
Databank (US Department of Transportation).
Total Liner Volume: Total volume of imports transported per maritime route (where we define
routes as “from foreign country to US coast”). Source: Constructed from data of US Import
Waterborne Databank (US Department of Transportation).
Foreign GDP per capita: GDP per capita of the exporting countries to the US. Source: World
Development Indicators 2000 (The World Bank).
Port Efficiency: one-to-seven index ranking port efficiency, based on surveys performed to
representative firms of each country. The specific question is “Port facilities and inland
waterways are extensive and efficient (1=strongly disagree, 7=stronlgy agree).” Source: World
Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report, various years (1996-2000)
Port Efficiency Variables (Tables 3 and 4)
Container Handling Charges: Correspond to containers handling charges inside the ports,
expressed in US$ per TEU (Twenty Feet Equivalent Unit). For nineteen countries we have
information from the Transport Division of the World Bank. For twelve countries, from which
eight are in the World Bank sample, we have information (as an index) from the Cámara37
Marítima y Portuaria de Chile A.G. Finally, for four Central American countries from which
only Panama is in the previous samples, we have information from the Louisiana State
University National Ports and Waterways Institute. Using ratios, we put all samples in the same
unit used by the data from the World Bank.   
Port Efficiency: Same as above.
Custom Clearance: Corresponds to time (days, median) to clear customs, based on surveys
performed (by the World Bank) to importers in each country. The specific question is “If you
import, how long does it typically take from the time your goods arrive at their port of entry until
the time you can claim them from customs?” Source: World Bank.
Manufactures wages: Source: UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database.
Infrastructure Index: Correspond to the simple average of three normalized indices that take into
account the country level of communications (telephones) and its physical transport
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and Ti is the fixed and mobile telephone lines per capita of country i, PAi is the number of paved
airports, Pi refers to the population, Si refers to the surface area, PRi is paved roads, and RRi is
railroads. The sources for the variables are: World Development Indicators 2000 (World Bank)
and World Factbook 2000 (Central Intelligence Agency).
Port Efficiency Estimation (Table 5)
Infrastructure Index: same as above.
Cargo Handling Restrictions: zero-to-one index that captures restrictions and special
requirements imposed to foreign suppliers of cargo handling services. The index takes a value of
0 if no restriction exists, 0.25 for minor restrictions, 0.5 if a joint venture condition is imposed,
0.75 if a very high national participation in the company is required, and 1 if foreign companies
are simply forbidden to provide cargo handling services. Source: Fink, Mattoo and Neagu
(2000).
Mandatory Port Services: zero-to-one index that captures the extent to which port services are
mandatory for incoming ships. This variable is constructed adding 0.125 for each of the
following services if they are mandatory: pilotage, towing, tug assistance, navigation aids,
berthing, waste disposal, anchorage and others mandatory services. Source: Fink, Mattoo and
Neagu (2000).38
Organized Crime: one-to-seven index ranking “organized crime has not been a problem,” based
on surveys performed to representative firms of each country. The specific question is
“Organized crime does not impose significant costs on business and is not a burden (1=strongly
disagree, 7=strongly agree).” Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report,
various years (1996-2000)39
Appendix B. Data Used
Cargo Hand. Mandatory Price Fixed Cooperative Median Port Crime Container Handling Charges
Country Restriction Services Agreements Agreements Clearance time Efficiency Worl Bank CMPCH LSU
Index Index Index Index Days Index (1-7) Index (1-7) US$/TEU Index Index
Argentina 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.00 7.0 3.81 4.52 na 139 na
Armenia na na na na 4.0 na Na na na na
Australia 0.00 0.13 1.00 1.00 na 4.79 6.19 199 na na
Azerbija na na na na 5.0 na na na na na
Belarus na na na na 4.0 na na na na na
Belgium 0.00 0.06 1.00 0.00 na 6.17 5.73 120 na na
Belize na na na na 5.0 na na na na na
Benin 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 na na na na na na
Bolivia na na na na 9.5 1.61 4.38 na na na
Botswana na na na na 4.0 na na na na na
Brazil 0.50 0.75 0.00 1.00 10.0 2.92 4.45 328 292 na
Brunei 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 na na na na na na
Bulgaria na na na na 2.0 3.68 3.23 na na na
Cambodia na na na na 7.0 na na na na na
Cameroon na na na na 20.0 na na na na na
Canada 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 2.0 6.42 6.27 190 na na
CDI na na na na 8.5 na na na na na
Chile 0.00 0.25 0.43 1.00 3.0 3.76 6.05 202 100 na
China 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.0 3.49 4.44 110 na na
Colombia 0.50 0.13 0.50 1.00 7.0 2.26 1.88 na na na
Costa Rica 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4.0 2.46 3.28 na na 68
Croatia na na na na 2.0 na na na na na
Cyprus 1.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 na na na na na na
Czech Rep na na na na 2.0 3.27 4.41 na na na
Trinidad and T. na na na na 7.0 na na na na na
Denmark 0.00 0.06 1.00 0.00 na 6.16 6.71 na na na
Dominican R. 0.25 0.25 0.50 1.00 7.0 na na na na na
Ecuador 0.00 0.00 0.43 1.00 15.0 2.63 3.65 na 139 na
Egypt 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.00 5.5 3.72 6.37 na na na
El Salvador 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 4.0 2.95 2.30 na na 61
Estonia na na na na 1.0 na na na na na
Ethiopia na na na na 30.0 na na na na na
Finland 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 na 6.26 6.63 na na na
France 0.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 3.0 5.39 6.58 201 na na
Georgia na na na na 2.0 na na na na na
Germany 0.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 5.0 6.38 6.02 163 117 na
Ghana 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 5.0 na na na na na
Greece 1.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 na 4.28 5.60 na na na
Guatemala na na na na 7.0 na na na na 55
Haiti na na na na 15.0 na na na na na40
(continued)
Cargo Hand. Mandatory Price Fixed Cooperative Median Port Crime Container Handling Charges
Country Restriction Services Agreements Agreements Clearance time Efficiency Index (1-7) World Bank CMPCH LSU
Index Index Index Index Days Index (1-7) US$/TEU Index Index
Honduras na na na na 4.0 na na na na na
Hong Kong 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 na 6.38 5.46 na na na
Hungary na na na na 3.0 2.59 4.14 na na na
Iceland 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 na 5.78 6.64 na na na
India 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 na 2.79 4.28 na na na
Indonesia 1.00 0.06 0.00 0.38 5.0 3.41 4.06 na na na
Ireland 0.00 0.13 1.00 0.00 na 4.28 5.12 na na na
Italy 0.25 0.50 0.38 0.00 2.0 4.11 3.29 228 na na
Ivory Coast 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 na na na na na na
Jamaica 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.60 na na na na na na
Japan 0.75 0.13 0.89 1.00 na 5.16 5.16 250 202 na
Kazakhst na na na na 9.0 na na na na na
Kenya na na na na 14.0 na na na na na
Korea 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 na 4.12 5.22 na na na
Kyrghizs na na na na 10.0 na na na na na
Lithuani na na na na 1.0 na na na na na
Madagascar na na na na 10.0 na na na na na
Malawi na na na na 17.0 na na na na na
Malaysia 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.38 7.0 4.95 5.76 75 na na
Mauritius 1.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 na 5.35 5.53 na na na
Mexico 0.50 0.38 0.00 1.00 4.0 3.34 2.61 na na na
Moldova na na na na 5.0 na na na na na
Morocco 0.50 0.13 0.00 0.00 na na na na na na
Namibia na na na na 4.0 na na na na na
Netherlands 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 na 6.64 5.42 156 84 na
New Zealand 0.00 0.38 1.00 1.00 na 5.82 6.14 na na na
Nicaragua 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.0 na na na na na
Nigeria 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 18.0 na na na na na
Panama na na na na 5.0 na na na 234 100
Papa N.Guinea 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 na na na na na na
Peru 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 7.0 2.88 3.32 na 142 na
Philippines 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.38 7.0 2.79 3.51 118 na na
Poland 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.0 3.34 3.41 na na na
Portugal 0.00 0.13 1.00 0.00 8.0 3.81 6.50 na na na
Romania 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.00 3.0 na na na na na
Russia na na na na 7.0 3.33 2.23 na na na
Senegal 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 7.0 na na na na na
Singapore 1.00 0.38 0.00 0.33 2.0 6.76 6.72 117 na na
Slovakia na na na na 2.0 3.50 4.35 na na na
Slovenia na na na na 2.0 na na na na na41
(continued)
Cargo Hand. Mandatory Price Fixed Cooperative Median Port Crime Container Handling Charges
Country Restriction Services Agreements Agreements Clearence time Efficiency Index (1-7) Worl Bank CMPCH LSU
Index Index Index Index Days Index (1-7) US$/TEU Index Index
South Africa na na na na 5.0 5.24 2.08 na na na
Spain 0.00 0.06 1.00 0.00 4.0 4.88 6.08 200 105 na
Sweden 0.00 0.06 1.00 0.00 2.0 5.73 6.46 na na na
Taiwan 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 na 5.18 4.49 140 163 na
Tanzania na na na na 14.0 na na na na na
Thailand 0.50 0.63 0.00 0.38 4.0 3.98 5.12 93 na na
Togo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 na na na na na na
Tunisia 0.50 0.13 0.00 0.00 5.5 na na na na na
Turkey 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.00 na 3.81 5.00 na na na
Uganda na na na na 14.0 na na na na na
Ukraine na na na na 10.0 3.41 3.28 na na na
United Kingdom 0.00 0.31 1.00 0.00 4.0 5.37 6.17 173 na na
United States na na na na 5.0 6.27 5.40 259 336 na
Uruguay 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.0 na na na na na
Uzbekist na na na na 7.0 na na na na na
Venezuela 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 11.0 3.28 3.63 na na na
Vietnam 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 na 3.81 5.02 na na na
Zambia na na na na 10.0 na na na na na
Zimbabwe na na na na 10.0 3.29 5.15 na na na
na: not available42
Figure 1
Estimates of Total Imports Freight Costs Relative to Imports (cif),
1997
Figure 2
Imports Freight Costs (CIF/FOB ratio) and Import Tariffs

















































































Export Freight Costs and US Tariff,
Latin American Countries, 1998
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Commerce.
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Handling Costs and Seaport Efficiency, 1998
Figure 5

























































































Source: Cámara Marítima y Portuaria de Chile (1999).
Figure 7




























Table 1: Determinants of Maritime Transport Costs, 1998
Dependent Variable: TC=(Charges / Weight)
OLS estimations IV estimations
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17
(11.37)*** (9.83)*** (11.41)*** (10.21)*** (8.47)*** (10.37)***
Weight value 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
(54.77)*** (51.66)*** (48.78)*** (54.75)*** (50.96)*** (48.81)***
Policy variables
   Price fixing rate agreement 0.06 0.02 -0.00 0.06 0.02 0.01
   (=1 if agreement exist) (1.88)* (0.64) (0.14) (1.71)* (0.51) (0.28)
   Cooperative agreement -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
   (=1 if agreement exist) (0.89) (1.30) (0.78) (0.90) (1.23) (0.83)
Containerization -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(2.78)*** (2.30)** (2.22)** (2.87)*** (2.27)** (2.28)**
Total liner volume -0.02 -0.02 -0.03  --  --  --
(foreign country to US coast) (3.70)*** (2.85)*** (4.47)***  --  --  --
Total liner volume (Instr)  --  --  -- -0.02 -0.04 -0.04
(foreign GDP)  --  --  -- (2.19)** (2.72)*** (3.85)***
Foreign port efficiency
   Foreign GDP per capita -0.05  --  -- -0.05  --  --
   (proxy for infrastructure) (5.78)***  --  -- (5.16)***  --  --
   Port efficiency  -- -0.05  --  -- -0.05  --
   (Global Compet. Report)  -- (3.87)***  --  -- (3.53)***  --
   Infrastructure Index  --  -- -0.03  --  -- -0.03
   (proxy for port infrast.)  --  -- (3.36)***  --  -- (3.50)***
Observations 332,593 314,462 289,834 332,593 314,462 289,834
R-squared (adj.) 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All estimations include fixed effects for products (4848 products) and for US districts (31 districts).
Regressions allow the observations to be independent across exporting countries, and interdependent within
each country.47
Table 2: Determinants of Maritime Transport Costs, 1995-1999
Dependent Variable: TC=(Charges / Weight)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Distance 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.25
(6.30)*** (5.61)*** (6.34)*** (8.47)*** (9.86)***
Weight value 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.53
(49.87)*** (42.34)*** (56.63)*** (50.96)*** (54.48)***
Policy variables
   Price fixing rate agreement 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.02 -0.07
   (=1 if agreement exist) (0.51) (1.13) (1.72)* (0.51) (1.98)**
   Cooperative agreement -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.01
   (=1 if agreement exist) (1.67)* (1.56) (0.99) (1.23) (0.35)
Containerization -0.03 0.02 -0.002 -0.03 0.003
(1.32) (0.91) (0.15) (2.27)** (0.12)
Total liner volume (Instr) -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.0001
(foreign GDP) (1.75)* (2.05)** (2.58)** (2.72)*** (0.01)
Foreign port efficiency
   Port efficiency -0.080 -0.072 -0.068 -0.053 -0.057
  (Global Compet. Report) (4.07)*** (4.07)*** (4.03)*** (3.53)*** (4.41)***
Observations 273,337 273,063 297,825 314,462 346,868
R-squared 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.45
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%. All estimations include fixed effects for products (4848 products) and for US districts (31).
Regressions allow the observations to be independent across exporting countries, and interdependent
within each country.48
Table 3: Port Efficiency Variables
Port Custom Container Handling
Efficiency Clearance Charges in Ports
(7=best, 1=worst) (days) (US$/TEU)
North  America 6.35 3.50 261.7
Europe (excl. East) 5.29 4.00 166.7
Middle East 4.93 na na
East Asia & the Pacific 4.66 5.57 150.5
East & South Africa 4.63 12.00 na
North Africa 3.72 5.50 na
Former Soviet Union 3.37 5.42 na
East Europe 3.28 2.38 na
Latin Am. & the Caribbean 2.90 7.08 251.4
South Asia 2.79 -- na
West Africa na 11.70 na
Sources: Global Competitiveness Report (1999), World Bank Surveys, Camara Maritima y
Portuaria de Chile. A.G. (1999), and LSU (1998). (na: not available)
Table 4: Handling Costs and Port Efficiency, 1998
Dependent variable: Container Handling Charges, divided by wage or proxy (in logarithm)
(1) (2) (3) 
a (4) (5) 
a










Port Efficiency -0.48 -0.37 -0.31 -0.33 -0.31
(Global Compet. Report) (14.69)*** (7.69)*** (3.95)*** (6.02)*** (5.09)***
Infrastructure Index 
b -0.14 -0.36 -0.42 -0.14 -0.14
(proxy for port
infrastructure)
(2.04)* (9.09)*** (12.89)*** (3.81)*** (4.24)***
Constant -2.28 -2.82 -3.20 -3.00 -3.11
(10.42)*** (10.00)*** (6.93)*** (9.38)*** (8.69)***
Observations 12 23 18 23 18
R-squared 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.88 0.88
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%. a: regression uses handling cost data from the World Bank only. b: the infrastructure index is
in logarithm.49
Table 5: Determinants of Port Efficiency, 1998
Dependent var.: Port Efficiency (from the Global Competitiveness Report)
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Infrastructure 0.27 0.26 0.26
(3.04)*** (2.81)*** (2.86)***
Cargo Handling Restrictions 0.84 0.05  --
(0.72) (0.16)  --
Cargo Handling Restrictions (sqr.) -0.85  --  --
(0.70)  --  --
Mandatory Port Services 3.43 3.37 3.41
(2.25)** (2.19)** (2.30)**
Mandatory Port Services (sqr.) -5.20 -4.90 -4.91
(2.42)** (2.31)** (2.34)**
Organized Crime 0.54 0.51 0.51
 (Org. crime is not a problem) (4.66)*** (5.72)*** (5.84)***
Constant 1.96 2.10 2.11
(2.65)** (3.37)*** (3.45)***
Nr. Observations 41 41 41
R sq. 0.77 0.77 0.77
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.